Robotech Electronics

All surviving vessels of this class were fitted in 2043-2044 with 'Shadow' protoculture stealth devices and radar absorbing hull covers in the months before their attempts to liberate the Earth from Invid occupation.
Some vessels received a Protoculture detector, mounted in a boom on the prow. This sensor was capable of detecting and identifying Invid energizer configurations at distances of over 20 AU. The boom extends 150 meters forward of the bow.
Piloting Control System:

(VQ-6A, -6B, -6C only)
2 x Robotech Research Group mk21 reflex semi-autonomous control system, requiring external high level control.
(VQ-6S only)
2 x Robotech Research Group mk83 Reflex (AI) Learning Neural Net System.

Radar tracking:

(VQ-6A, -6B, -6C only)
Hughes APG-101 X-band spherical pulse-Doppler, providing medium-range detection and tracking of targets at all altitudes.
(VQ-6S only)
Hughes APG-115 UWB pulse-Doppler phased array, providing spherical long-range detection and tracking of targets at all altitudes. Equipped with special 'stealthy' and passive modes.

Optical tracking (all):

Phillips AllView multi-band digital camera system, for medium range spherical infra-red imaging, optical and ultra-violet band detection and tracking
(VQ-6A, -6B, -6C only)
Thomson LT-5 multi-frequency laser ranger and designator.
(VQ-6S only)
Thomson LT-6 multi-frequency laser ranger and designator.

Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) (all):

Elettronica Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)
OlDelft Infra-red Warning Receiver (IRWR)
(VQ-6A, -6B, -6C only)
Westinghouse ALQ-246(V) active sensor jammer
(VQ-6S only)
Westinghouse ALQ-250(V) active sensor jammer (VQ-6S Only)
Chaff and smoke dispensers

Electronic Masking Systems (VQ-6S only):

RRG mk2 Shadow: four-dimensional distortion field generator (downshifts and dampens protoculture radiation)
RRG mk3 EM-absorbing skin cover, strongly absorbing EM radiation from radio through ultra-violet wavelengths, and emitting only weakly in these wavebands.
While the electronics suites of these vehicles differed with their respective dates of operational service, all electronics were regularly updated, and during the Second Robotech War the following standard was in use:
Radar tracking:

Westinghouse APG-145 X-band pulse-Doppler omni-directional radar.

Optical tracking:

Phillips AllView II multi-band omni-directional digital camera system, for medium range all attitude infra-red imaging, optical and ultra-violet band detection and tracking
Thomson LT-5 multi-frequency laser ranger and designator.

Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS):

Elettronica Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)
OlDelft Infra-red Warning Warning Receiver (IRWR)
Selenia Sky Warrior active/passive sensor jammers
Numerous dispenser for expendable decoys and countermeasures such as chaff and flares.

Hughes AWG-20 X-band pulse-Doppler radar, providing long-range detection and tracking of targets at all altitudes, as well as extensive surface search, attack, navigation, and mapping modes.

Optical tracking:

Thomson LT-3 multi-frequency laser ranger/designator
Zeiss FOI-8 infra-red imaging sensor and low-light level camera system in retractable optic ball-turret in front of the cockpit canopy.

Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS):

Elettronica Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)
OlDelft Infra-red Warning Receiver (IRWR)
Westinghouse ALQ-200 active radar jammer
Chaff dispenser
Active missile jammers.
Hughes AWG-20 X-band pulse-Doppler radar, providing long-range detection and tracking of targets at all altitudes, as well as extensive surface search, attack, navigation, and mapping modes.

Optical tracking:

Thomson LT-3 multi-frequency laser ranger/designator
Zeiss FOI-8 infra-red imaging sensor and low-light level camera system in retractable optic blister under the cockpit.

Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS):

Elettronica Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)
OlDelft Infra-red Warning Receiver (IRWR)
Westinghouse ALQ-200 active radar jammer
Chaff dispenser
Active missile jammers.
Anti-Missile Chaff Dispenser: Located at the very tail of the fighter are two chaff dispensers. When tailed by a missile, a cloud of chaff and other obtrusive particles can be released to confuse or detonate the enemy's attack. Rifts Earth decoy systems are assumed to not operate against Phase World missiles due to technological difference. Reduce effects by 20% against smart missiles (Add +20% to rolls for smart missiles.)

01-50 Enemy missile or missile volley detonates in chaff cloud - Missiles are all destroyed
51-75 An Enemy missile or missile volley loses track of real target and veers away in wrong direction (May lock onto another target)
76-00 No effect, missile is still on target

Also note that the chaff cloud will also blind flying monsters that fly through cloud. They will suffer the following penalties: reduce melee attacks/actions, combat bonuses, and speed by half. Duration: 1D4 melee rounds.
Payload: Eight (8) Hurricane Jammer on VAF-8ECM+: It Creates a jamming field in a 30 mile (48.3 km) radius in all directions around the fighter. It jams all radars, radios, and all equipment that uses RF waves. Included in the jamming are all friendly forces and all equipment in fighter that is using it. It's original design was stolen off of a fighter disigned by an enemy race known as the Surikii. The alien fighter is known as the Screamer.
Shadow Cloaking Device on VAF-8SF+: Cloaking device that makes the fighter invisible to most sensors. Usually strikes first on first round and thereafter gets +3 to initiative. See Robotech Sentinels for more details.
Radar: Range 500 miles (805 km) in an atmosphere and 25,000 miles (40,250 km) in space, can identify and track up to 64 targets simultaneously. It is also capable of Terrain Following for low altitude flight. With Combat & Targeting Computer, the standard version can fire missiles at up to sixteen targets at the same time.
V. A. S.: Visual magnification that multiplies all images by about 300 times which allows visual identification and tracking of fighter sized objects out to 30 to 40 miles.
E.S.M.: Radar Detector, Passively detects other radars being operated.
Laser Navigational System: Allow flight at low altitude without use of Radar. Gives a map of the Terrain
Radar tracking:

(VF-19B, -19C, VT-19)

General Electric AN/APG-180 X-Band, spherical pulse-Doppler, providing long-range detection and tracking of targets at all altitudes.
Westinghouse AN/APX-18 IFF friend or foe interrogator.

(VF-19J, 19S)

General Electric AN/APG-190 X-Band, spherical pulse-Doppler, providing long-range detection and tracking of targets at all altitudes.
Westinghouse AN/APX-22 IFF friend or foe interrogator.


Hughes AN/APG-191 X-Band, spherical pulse-Doppler, providing long-range detection and tracking of targets at all altitudes.
Westinghouse AN/APX-23 IFF friend or foe interrogator.

Optical tracking:


(Head/Turret) Kodak AN/DOS-4300 multi-band digital camera, for medium range, traversable, UV, infrared imaging and optical band detection and tracking.
Thomson AN/LT-9 multi-frequency laser designator and ranger.

(VF-19C, VT-19)

(Head/Turret) Phillips AN/DOS-4700 multi-band digital camera system, for medium range, traversable, UV, infrared imaging and optical band detection and tracking.
Thomson AN/LT-10 multi-frequency laser designator and ranger.

(VF-19J, -19K, -19S)

(Head/Turret) Phillips AN/DOS-5700 multi-band digital camera system, for medium range, traversable, UV, infrared imaging and optical band detection and tracking.
Thomson AN/LT-12 multi-frequency laser ranger and designator.

Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS):

(VF-19B, -19C, -19J, -19S, VT-19)

Loral AN/ALR-31 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)
Loral AN/AIR-20 Infra-red Warning Receiver (IRWR)
General Electric AN/ALQ-280(V) internal countermeasures system
Tracor AN/ALE-16 Chaff/Flare Dispensers
Westinghouse AN/AMJ-8 Active Missile Jammers
Multiple VHF and UHF antennas
Bose Loudspeakers producing sound up to 90 decibels.
Hughes PPBS-04 Pin-Point Barrier System: The VF-19 is equipped with a new mecha-scale pinpoint barrier system for defense. The system can generate a single pinpoint barrier that can be moved anywhere on the mecha and used as a shield against incoming attacks.


Loral AN/ALR-48 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)
Loral AN/AIR-34 Infra-red Warning Receiver (IRWR)
General Electric AN/ALQ-305 (V) internal countermeasures system
Tracor AN/ALE-16 Chaff/Flare Dispensers
Westinghouse AN/AMJ-12 Active Missile Jammers
Multiple VHF and UHF antennas
Sony holographic projectors. Can be used to produce simple images and 'dazzle' enemy pilots with bright lights
RRG Sound Energy System SES-01: the VF-19K is equipped with the revolutionary Sound Energy System (SES) developed by Dr. Chiba of UES Germany's science team. The SES allows the pilot to of the VF to focus their spiritia powers and use it for attack and defense.
Bose Loudspeakers producing sound up to 150 decibels.
Hughes PPBS-03 Pin-Point Barrier System: The VF-19K is equipped with a new mecha-scale pinpoint barrier system for defense. The system can generate a single pinpoint barrier that can be moved anywhere on the mecha and used as a shield against incoming attacks.


Additional: Lasers on head is replaced by a Marconi Spyeye MkII broad spectrum radiation sensors.
IBM-2600 onboard data interpretation system

NOTE: Various sensor systems like Inverted Synthetic Aperture Radar, high-definition cameras, radiation sensors, motion scanners et cetera may be pod-mounted on the wing and center body hardpoints.

Harris CT-12 computer targeting system and HUD in Battloid mode.
Short range radio.

(-052 Battler)

Avionica VR-34 short range millimeter radar (3 km range).
Phillips Miniview UV, IIR and optical sight system with light intensifier and computer enhancement.
Harris CT-12B computer targeting system with stereoscopic laser targeting and HUD in Battloid mode.
Short range radio.

(-055 Devastator)

As with the -052, but the targeting sensors are capable of a traverse up to +20 and -60 degrees in altitude above the horizon.

Note: All externally-mounted Cyclone weapons have integral laser designators built in, and the Cyclone is designed to detect and use the laser 'paint' for the targeting of the weapons.
The F-15 Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) AN/ALQ-135 Band 1.5 contributes to full-dimensional protection by improving individual aircraft probability of survival through improved air crew situation awareness of the radar guided threat environment, cueing both active and passive countermeasures in the Band 1.5 frequency spectrum, and adding a waveform select feature for jamming optimization against specific threats. The F-15 TEWS consists of the AN/ALR-56C radar warning receiver (RWR), the AN/ALQ-135 internal countermeasures set (ICS), the AN/ALQ-128 electronic warfare warning set, and the AN/ALE-40/45 countermeasures dispenser. TEWS provides electronic detection and identification of both surface and airborne threats. In addition, it allows for activation of appropriate countermeasures including electronic jamming and dispensing of expendables such as chaff and flares.

Integral to the F-15 TEWS, ALQ-135 ICS is an internally mounted responsive jammer designed to counter surface-to-air and air-to-air threats with minimum aircrew activity. The system is sized to fit into the limited space of the F-15E interdiction aircraft's ammunition bay although upgraded components have also been retrofitted into the F-15C air superiority variant. The system has an improved reprogramming support capability that rapidly changes pre-flight message software in response to changing threat parameters and mission requirements. The ALQ-135 ICS has been fielded in several phases to provide incremental improvements to jamming coverage. Phase one has provided an initial Band 3 capability which includes integrated operation with both the F-15E fire control radar and the ALR-56C RWR. ALQ-135 ICS Band 3 capability currently allows full interoperability and robust jamming techniques against modern pulse-Doppler radar. Full system capability requires the installation and integration of Band 1.5 hardware to provide coverage against threats operating in the lower frequency range.


ALQ-135 is an outgrowth of an early 1980s feasibility demonstration and a follow-on quick reaction capability high band jammer developed to counter rapidly changing threats. Developmental problems precipitated a restructuring of the ALQ-135 ICS program in 1988 to provide incremental capabilities. A TEWS EOA of Phase I Band 3 ICS was planned in July 1989 to support F-15E IOC. However, technical problems delayed the start of EOA until July 1990. Fifteen sorties were flown against threat simulators on the Eglin AFB, FL range complex in air-to-air and air-to-ground mission scenarios. ICS demonstrated the capability to identify and counter most current threats in a limited density environment, but the test indicated that additional software and hardware development was necessary to achieve desired operational capabilities.

AFOTEC was directed to conduct an interim TEWS OA to characterize the operational capabilities and limitations of the fielded systems and assess readiness for IOT&E. The OA concluded in September 1994 recommended five ALQ-135 improvements: (1) interoperability with the APG-70 radar; (2) system response times; (3) built-in-test (BIT) displays; (4) BIT accuracy; and (5) low band frequency coverage for the F-15E (i.e., Band 1.5).

FOT&E operations conducted by the United States Air Force Air Warfare Center (USAFAWC) concluded in August 1996 and addressed ALQ-135 Band 3 ICS interoperability with the APG-70 radar as well as improvements in the BIT displays. USAFAWC is currently conducting FOT&E at the Multi-Spectral Threat Environment range located at Eglin AFB to evaluate intra-flight (wing man) compatibility-the advanced threat de-interleave processor (for improved system response times) and jamming effectiveness and BIT upgrades.


The ALQ-135 Band 1.5 TEMP was approved in May 1998. Developmental testing of the ALQ-135 began in June 1998 with initial focus on integration and interoperability testing between the ALQ-135 ICS with Band 1.5 installed and other F-15E weapons systems such as the ALR-56C radar warning receiver. Currently, developmental tests are focused on response time measurements as well as correct radio frequency (RF) threat identification and correct RF counter technique generation. Developmental testing is proceeding on schedule.

Operational testing is scheduled to begin in February 1999 and continue through August 1999. Operational test planning is proceeding on schedule. DOT&E approval of the OT test plan is expected in December 1998.

Band 1.5 integration into the ALQ-135 ICS extends frequency coverage into the lower bands of the electromagnetic spectrum, complementing Band 3 frequency coverage. COIs anticipated for Band 1.5 integration include: (1) does the Band 1.5 system provide effective threat countermeasures to reduce threat lethality in its intended operational environment; (2) is the Band 1.5 system interoperable with TEWS and compatible with the F-15E operational environment; and (3) does the operational readiness of the Band 1.5 system support 5-15E mission requirements.

DOT&E staff will continue to monitor and participate in test planning activities through the attendance of ALQ-135 Band 1.5 Test Plan Working Group meetings. DOT&E staff will review for approval finalized versions of the ALQ-135 Band 1.5 TEMP and OTP prior to commencement of OT.


Although no operational test for the ALQ-135 Band 1.5 equipment has occurred, DOT&E staff are monitoring ongoing DT events. Suitability data on production representative ALQ-135 Band 1.5 equipment collected during DT should increase the sample size of data available for OT suitability analysis. Monitoring of DT integration/interoperability, response time, threat identification and countermeasure response testing is providing both DOT&E staff and OT test teams with technical insight into the ALQ-135 system and its operation. Insight gained from monitoring DT activities will allow OT test teams to optimize the adequacy of OT test plans.

Operational test planning is progressing on schedule. All major effectiveness and suitability performance parameters will be evaluated. The focus of testing will include: (1) testing against a variety of available airborne and ground based threats; (2) operating Band 1.5 equipment with aircraft systems (and jointly) during multi-ship formations; and (3) operating Band 1.5 equipment concurrently with other F-15 TEWS systems; e.g., Band 3 jamming equipment.

The program intends to follow the predict-test-compare methodology by utilizing modeling and simulation and ground test facilities to minimize risk and optimize open-air tests. Ground test facilities will be utilized to create unique, dense signal environments that otherwise would not be found on open-air test ranges. Thirty-five flight test missions are currently scheduled in support of DT&E. Preliminary risk reduction will be conducted utilizing the Air Force's Multi-Spectral Threat Environment Facility. Twenty-six additional flight test missions will be flown in support of IOT&E. Flight test missions for both DT&E and IOT&E will be conducted primarily at the Western Test Range (WTR). China Lake will be utilized for threats not available at WTR.
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Electronic warfare in a passive EO/IR target acquisition and weapons sensors environment applies to a growing threat ca­pability. The open-ocean blue-water scenario requires EO/IR EA and EP ship protection, typically 200 nautical miles or more from shore, against massive and coordinated attack. EO/IR EA applications have recently focused on littoral sce­narios involving amphibious operations in support of peace­keeping operations for regional conflicts; providing humani­tarian assistance in politically and militarily unstable re­gions; evacuating civilians from regions of conflict; and ensur­ing safe passage of commerce through disputed littoral waters and choke points.

The traditional EO/IR threat, the long-range antiship mis­sile, has been intensified in the littoral areas by a large vari­ety of air-to-surface, air-to-air, and surface-to-air EO/IR mis­sile weapons. These missiles can inflict severe damage to the smaller craft used for littoral warfare.

Electro-optic system target detection range depends on de­tector sensitivity and resolution. A target image is defined by contrast with the background. Sensitivity determines whether the contrast is discernible. Resolution depends on the spatial environment angle illuminating the detector, which is a function of detector surface area and focusing op­tics. The distance at which target features are resolvable de­termines the maximum operating range of the system.

The target signature detectability is not determined by the absolute temperature of the object but rather by the contrast between the target and background within a given spectral band. Environment backgrounds range from the cold, uniform background of space to thermally cluttered land areas. Solar interaction with the target and background reflection and heating further degrade the background contrast with the target. Typical target contrasts range from about 1 kW/sr (kilowatt per steradian) in the 2 ^m to 3 ^m atmospheric win­dow for an aircraft engine to tens of kilowatts per steradian for ships in the 8 ^m to 12 ^m window. Target aspect, espe­cially the location of hot spots, greatly influences the sig­nature.

Electro-Optic/Infrared Countermeasures. Electro-optic/infra­red countermeasures are constrained by specular atmospheric propagative characteristics, as is the threat (Fig. 14). The con­trast of the target to the background within the weapon sen­sor’s specular passband, the type of seeker spatial localization processing, and available practical radiation sources are also prime considerations.

The missile fly-out and CM sequence of events occurs in several seconds. As part of an integrated electronic warfare suite, the EO/IR EA system is designed to engage a large number of missiles launched in a coordinated attack. Figure

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

ASM Range from the ship (km)

Figure 15. Missile attack time line show­ing launch, acquisition, and homing phases of the missile as well as the CM attack on missile sensors and control cir­cuits.

15 shows a typical time line of the CM response to an attack by a subsonic antiship missile. The time line indicates the interaction of EO/IR EA with other ship defense systems.

To preclude detection by a threat EO/IR sensor, target sig­nature can be reduced through a combination of convective, conductive, and radiative mechanisms. Exterior surfaces of ship stacks are cooled by convective air flow between the en­gine exhaust ports and the outer stacks. Engine plume and exhaust gases from all types of engines can be cooled by dilu­tion with air. Radiation from hot spots can be reduced by spectral emissivity modifications or by obscuring the hot areas from view. On new platforms, low-observability design criteria have led to low-signature aircraft and ships.

Onboard aircraft CM sources initially generated false tar­get location and/or guidance degradation through weapon au­tomatic gain control (AGC) manipulation. This technique re­mains highly effective against many threats. The onboard jammer sources can be chemically fueled IR sources or electri­cally powered incandescent and metal vapor lamps. As the wavelength passbands of antiair and antiship seekers gradu­ally migrate to longer wavelengths, out to the 8 ^m to 14 ^m window, noncoherent sources will no longer be practical.

Basic spin scan and conical scan (conscan) ‘‘hot spot’’ seek­ers are vulnerable to flare decoys. Almost universally, these flares are composed of magnesium and polytetrafluoroeth – ylene and are designed with a radiant intensity several times that of the target. In the distraction mode, the decoy is an excellent target; in the seduction mode, the weapon’s seeker control signal is biased by the decoy or transferred to it. Be­cause pseudoimaging seekers exhibit spatial and temporal processing capabilities, simple flares are relatively ineffective, and simple flares perform even more poorly against imaging sensors. Newer decoys overcome advanced seeker-discrimi­nating processing with improved spectral characteristics that more closely match the target platform spectral emissions. Improved decoy spatial distribution in the form of clouds and multiple hot spots, temporal rise times, and persistence match target-signature increase rates and lifetimes, thus pre­venting time-history discrimination. Kinematics model realis­tic target movement.

The small beam divergence of lasers can result in high – radiance, low-power sources that provide the J/S power ratios needed for effective EA. Two laser sources, primary lasers and nonlinearly shifted lasers, are available for CM applica­tions. Lasers shifted by nonlinear conversion include har­monic generation and tunable optical parametric oscillators (OPOs). Primary lasers do not produce spectral lines in all of the potential threat passbands of interest and are susceptible to notch-filter counter-countermeasure techniques. Although harmonic generating EA techniques provide additional wave­lengths, they are also subject to counter CM. Promising sources for IR/EO CM are tunable OPOs pumped by diode – pumped, solid-state lasers. Two nonlinear materials currently demonstrating the highest potential are periodically poled lithium niobate (PPLN) and zinc germanium phosphide (ZnGeP2). Figure 14 shows the primary lasers of interest and the wavelength coverage possible with PPLN and ZnGeP2 OPOs.

Although noncoherent sources provide wide angular pro­tection, high-resolution detection is necessary to point and track the threat system and effectively use laser power. Timely threat detection and warning ES is essential to the success of all nonpreemptive EA.

Electro-Optic/Infrared Countermeasure Technology. Key

EO/IR EA technologies required to counter threat perfor­mance improvements include higher throughput data pro­cessing using more capable algorithms, laser beam steering, and decoy launcher design. Needed processing improvements include faster signal processing, more efficient image pro­cessing, and false alarm reduction. High-performance, high­speed beam steering, preferably nonmechanical, is required to reduce response time in multiple threat environments. Im­proved decoy launchers to position decoys quickly and accu­rately within the scenario are also needed.

Low observability technologies are being developed to de­crease or mask the IR/EO signatures of targets. Target signa­ture reduction increases the effectiveness of conventional countermeasure responses by reducing the jamming power re­quired to counter the missile system effectively. Low observ-

ability enables applying new technologies to IR/EO counter­measures by reducing the size, weight, and power requirements of decoy and laser CM sources. For example, diode laser and diode-pumped nonlinear optical sources can be integrated with unmanned aerial vehicles to produce new classes of CM devices and tactics. Large-area spectrally selec­tive sources and obscurants provide advanced capability against spatially and spectrally discriminating threats. Pri­mary laser and laser-pumped nonlinear sources are impor­tant evolving technologies. Launchers and vehicles that pro­vide rapid and precise CM placement with realistic kinematic performance are areas of increasing importance.

Decoy Countermeasures

Decoys are EW devices, usually expendable, deployed from the platforms to be protected. Decoys generate a jamming re­sponse to the threat or false targets. In either case, the decoy lures the threat away from the intended target toward the decoy. A jamming decoy generates a cover signal that masks the target signal. Thereby the threat sensor signal fidelity is degraded, making detection and tracking of the intended tar­get more difficult. A jamming signal may also activate the antijam home-on-jam mode of the weapon system. As false targets, the decoys generate credible target signatures to pro­vide weapon system seduction or distraction. Decoys create confusion that causes weapons to attack false targets.

Decoys may be either passive or active. A passive decoy generates a countermeasure response without the direct, ac­tive amplification of the threat signal. Principal examples of passive decoys are chaff and corner reflectors in the RF spec­trum and flares in the EO/IR spectrum.

Decoy Operational Employment. Decoys provide EA capabil­ity across the entire EW battle time line. Decoys are used primarily for EP missile defense and self-protection missile defense but also for countersurveillance and countertar­geting applications.

Jamming is used in conjunction with decoys to obscure the target signal at the threat radar during decoy deployment. As decoys are deployed, jamming ceases and the threat radar acquires the decoy as a target or transfers radar tracking from the target to the decoy. Threat radar acquisition of the decoy as a target is probable because decoys present promi­nent signatures.

Decoys used for missile defense perform either seduction, distraction, or preferential acquisition functions. A single de­coy type may perform multiple functions, depending on de­ployment geometry with respect to the launch aircraft or ship and the stage of electronic combat.

Decoys are used in a seduction role as a terminal defense countermeasure against missile weapons systems. A seduc­tion decoy transfers the lock of the missile guidance radar or EO/IR sensor from the defending platform onto itself. The de­coy that generates a false-target signature is initially placed in the same threat tracking gate, missile sensor range, and/ or angle segment as the defending target and is subsequently separated from the launching platform. The decoy signature captures the missile guidance sensor, and the target lock is transferred from the ship or aircraft to the decoy. Typically, the decoy is separated in both range and angle from the de­fending target to assure target-to-missile physical separation

Figure 16. ALE-129 RF chaff round with the bundle of reflector ele­ments partially deployed from the canister.

greater than the missile warhead’s blast range. The seduction decoy missile interaction is typically initiated within 10 s of deployment. Distraction decoys are deployed prior to missile – seeker acquisition and provide multiple false targets from which the seeker may select. Deployed distraction decoys pro­vide a confusing environment to the missile seeker, causing it to attack a decoy rather than the intended target.

The ALE-129 chaff decoy (Fig. 16) is representative of RF seduction decoys for aircraft defense. The NATO Sea Gnat MK-214 cartridge shown fired from a shipboard launcher in Fig. 17 provides surface defense against radar-guided weap­ons. Figure 18 shows a TORCH decoy deployed at sea for IR defense.

Distraction decoys are observed for extended periods in the engagement scenario. Consequently, the distraction decoy must generate a credible signature that is sufficient to pre­clude short-term and extended missile decoy discrimination.

The AN/SLQ-49 inflatable corner reflector (Fig. 19) and the rocket-launched NATO Sea Gnat MK-216 chaff cartridge (Fig. 20) are representative of distraction decoys for surface ship defense. The TALD decoy (Fig. 21) is an example of a distraction decoy used for aircraft defense.


Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 17. NATO Sea Gnat MK-214 seduction RF decoy deployed from a shipboard rocket launcher.

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 18. TORCH EO/IR decoy deployed at sea.

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 22. AN/ALE-50 towed decoy deployed from a tactical aircraft in flight.

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 19. AN/SLQ-49 inflatable corner reflector decoy deployed at sea.

Frequently, persistent seduction decoys perform a distrac­tion function after separating sufficiently from the defended platform. This ‘‘residual distraction’’ further minimizes the number of distraction decoys required in an engagement.

An EA preferential acquisition decoy provides a signature to the missile seeker such that during acquisition the missile seeker senses the real target only in combination with the decoy signature. In the end game, the decoy signature in the missile field of view biases the aim point of the missile tracker away from the intended target.

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 20. NATO Sea Gnat MK-216 distraction decoy deployed from a rocket launcher.

The preferential acquisition concept requires decoys posi­tioned close to the defending platform. Decoys can be towed behind the target aircraft or tethered to the defending ship. The AN/ALE-50 (Fig. 22) is a towed decoy used for air defense preferential acquisition, and the EAGER decoy (Fig. 23) is be­ing developed for ship defense preferential acquisition.

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 21. TALD decoy distraction decoy.

Chaff Decoys. A chaff decoy is composed of multiple—tens of thousands to millions—of electrically conductive dipole fil­ament elements deployed in the air to reflect and scatter ra­dar signal radiation and create a false-target radar response. Figure 24 shows a typical deployed chaff decoy. The chaff de­coy frequency response is determined by the length of the di­pole elements, and the chaff radar cross-sectional (RCS) mag-

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 23. EAGER shipboard-tethered decoy in field trials.

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 24. Deployed chaff round shown as a burst of reflector ele­ments against a sky background.

nitude results from the number of dipoles deployed. Figure 25 shows a radar PPI display of an environment containing numerous chaff clouds.

The RCS of a chaff cloud is tuned for a given frequency (with the dipole length one-half the wavelength of the inci­dent radar signal), and its RCS can be approximated by

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 26. Multifaceted corner reflector deployed on a ship bow to provide a high cross-sectional reflection at several frequencies.

parent target signature. Figure 26 shows a multifaceted tri­angular corner reflector that provides wide angular coverage.

The apparent RCS normal to a triangular corner reflector is given by

13nai 2> 0.018c2iV

RCS(m ) =——— ——-

2 4n L4 f 2

RCS(m ) = —



Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 25. Radar PPI display showing target reflections from multi ple chaff decoys.

Passive Electro-Optic/Infrared Electronic Warfare

Figure 27. Flare IR decoy deployed from a tactical aircraft in flight.

Active Decoys. An active decoy uses direct threat signal amplification to generate the countermeasure response. In the case of RF systems, it is generally an RF amplifier (tran­sistor or tube). In the EO/IR spectrum, a laser or flash tube amplifies the threat signal. Jammer and repeater decoys are active decoys.

Repeater decoys receive, amplify, and retransmit the re­ceived signal to generate a false target. Multiple signals may be retransmitted to generate multiple target returns. Modula­tion techniques (amplitude and frequency) may also be ap-

where c is the speed of light (3 X 108 m/s), f is the frequency in hertz, and N is the number of dipoles in the cloud.

Corner Reflector Decoys. Corner reflectors are conductive geometric structures that are typically shaped in the form of a perpendicular triangular corner. The shape maximizes the reflection of incident radar signals and provides a large ap – where L is the length from the outside corner to the apex of the reflector, f is the frequency in hertz, and c is the speed of light (3 X 108 m/s). The 3 dB beamwidth of this type of corner reflector is 40°.

Flare Decoys. Flares are typically incendiary devices that produce EO/IR radiation to generate a false target. Figure 27 is an IR image of a magnesium-Teflon flare deployed from an aircraft.

plied to the signal before retransmission to enhance effective­ness. The apparent radar cross section of an active RF decoy is given by

RCS(m2) =

(PdGd4n R2)



where PdGd is the effective radiated power (ERP) of the decoy, R is the range between the decoy and the radar in meters, and PrGr is the effective radiated power (ERP) of the radar.

For a decoy operating with linear gain, that is, a decoy whose transmission signal power is directly proportional to the input signal level (up to the signal compression level), the RCS relationship simplifies to the relationship given by

RCS(m2) =

2, (Gtc 2)


4n f 2

where Gt is the combined electronic and antenna gains (re­ceive and transmit) of the decoy, c is the speed of light (3 X 108 m/s), and f is the frequency in hertz.

future systems include broad bandwidth microwave and milli­meter-wave components (e. g., antennas and amplifiers).

Microwave and millimeter-wave output power sources are required with high power, efficiency, and duty cycle to sup­port the projected threat environments. The future RF threat environment is expected to be densely populated with long – pulse radar. Higher decoy radiated power at higher duty cy­cles will be needed to prevent decoy saturation as the number of simultaneous threat signals in the environment increases.

Ultra high speed countermeasure frequency set on cir­cuitry is necessary to queue jammer frequency rapidly. Sig­nals with rapid frequency hopping and frequency chirping re­quire rapid activation for effective countermeasures. Spatially large and efficient spectrally matched IR materials and radi­ating structures are needed to counter multispectral, imaging IR seekers. Safe, nontoxic, highly opaque, broad-spectrum IR and electro-optical obscuration materials are required to mask targets and confuse image-processing seekers. Efficient, primary power sources capable of high peak power and dense energy storage are needed to provide the increasing demand for electrical power used in decoy systems.


Decoy Effectiveness. A distraction decoy is deployed at an extended range from the defending platform and provides an alternate target for seeker lock-on. Distraction decoys require deployment before seeker lock-on to engage the radar in its acquisition process. Usually more than one distraction decoy is used to defend a platform. An estimate of the effectiveness of the distraction decoy is given by


Ps = 1-

N +1

where Ps is the probability that the missile will be distracted to the decoy and N is the number of distraction decoys de­ployed.

Equation (17) assumes that all of the distraction decoys exhibit viable target signatures and are equally likely to be acquired by the missile sensor. The number of decoys de­ployed can be reduced with the same probability of success with knowledge of the seeker acquisition logic, for example, a near-to-far/right-to-left acquisition search.

Seduction decoy effectiveness is primarily determined by the intensity of the decoy signature compared with the target being defended. However, the radar track bias, for example, leading edge tracker and discrimination algorithms, can sig­nificantly impact decoy effectiveness. In some cases, the radar track bias can be exploited to increase decoy seduction effec­tiveness.

Decoy Countermeasure Technology. Diverse technologies are required to support decoy launch and station keeping and countermeasure generation. Because most decoys are single­event, short-term items, cost plays a major role in selecting and developing technology for decoy use. Furthermore, be­cause the defending platform must generally deploy a number of decoys throughout an engagement, decoy size and weight criteria also are critical. Attendant decoy platform technolo­gies include aerodynamics, aircraft/projectile design, propul­sion systems, avionics, and mechanical structures. Decoy pay­load technologies that will have significant importance in
K. Electronic Warfare/Directed Energy Weapons

1. Scope

Electronic Warfare includes any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or attack an enemy. Electronic warfare comprises three major subdivisions: Electronic Attack—use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability; Electronic Support—actions taken by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for immediate threat recognition in support of EW operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, homing, and targeting; and Electronic Protection—actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, or equipment for any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Electronic warfare and directed warfare are leading technologies for solving Army problems in scenarios where non-lethal (i.e., no permanent injury) or less than lethal (i.e., could suffer serious injury) force is required.

Figure IV-K-1 illustrates DEW and jamming applications on the battlefield. Figure IV-K-2 depicts the electronic power relationships between electronic warfare jammers and RF-directed energy weapons.

Figure IV-K-1. Battlefield Applications of DEW and Jamming

Figure IV-K-2 Comparison of EW Jammer and RF-DEW Power Relationship

2. Rationale

As the roles, missions, and capabilities of today’s Army evolve into the 21st century, so then does the role of electronic warfare. Dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum based on the ability to use and deny its use by others at will is dependent on industry, academia, the other services, and a robust program to sustain the Army’s unique requirements on the electronic battlefield. As threat systems become more complex, the need to develop EW systems that can respond to changing environments is critical to superior battlefield surveillance and survivability. Technology to collect, recognize, and process complex wave forms and provide effective jamming are essential. Knowledge-based systems using artificial intelligence and adaptive parallel distributed processing can provide "smart" software control to maintain an edge on a dense signal battlefield.

3. Technology Subareas

a. Electronic Attack

Goals and Time Frames

Develop the technologies that provide the capability to intercept and bring under electronic attack advanced communications signals being used by adversarial command and control networks on the digital battlefield. Through electronic attack strategies demonstrated with prototype hardware and software, these digital communications signals will be disrupted, denied, and/or modified to render the communications system ineffective and unreliable to the threat command and control function. Near-term goals are to demonstrate electronic attack against a set of digital formats being implemented in commercial communications systems and data transmission systems. Mid-term goals are to demonstrate the ability to disrupt other commercial communication networks and wide bandwidth communications. Long-term goals include the ability to surgically attack specific users in a non-obtrusive means while maintaining the overall integrity of the targeted communications network.

Major Technical Challenges

The increasing use of common carrier commercial communications networks by potential adversaries presents the major technical challenge. We must be able to separate the threat-relevant communications from the pure commercial traffic and perform effective electronic warfare without disrupting the entire network. These targeted communication systems are characterized as adaptive sophisticated digital networks and modulation schemes that employ various layers of protocol and user protection.

Technology challenges include development of uncooled, low false alarm rate detectors with <1 degree AOA accuracy, development of multi-color IR focal plane arrays (Navy/Air Force Program), missile detection algorithms, and development of more efficient, low-cost, temperature stable IR/UV filters. The development of advanced high speed wideband digital receivers using GaAs microscan design approach, and the development of high power ultra-wide band jamming modulators and transmitter sources from A through M bands using MPM, MMIC, and fiber-optic remoting of sensors and transmitters. Precision AOA for situational awareness and targeting.

b. Electronic Support

Goals and Time Frames

As modern communication systems evolve, the overall goal is to develop the technology required to provide an ES/EA capability to intercept and counter these new priority threats and to provide the battlefield commander the tactical intelligence products that contribute to his ability to accomplish his mission. Near-term goals include the downsizing of existing bulky components to provide a rapidly deployable capability and the conversion from special purpose processors and software to a general purpose suite. The intent is also to provide the ability to specifically tailor and reprogram these systems quickly either locally or remotely to meet the current and changing threat. Mid-term goals include development of signal processing techniques that provide effective ES against common carrier, multiple access commercial communications in order to identify, locate, and exploit threat users. A second goal is the development of the tools required to display increasingly complex data to the soldier operators in support of the IEW mission. The long-term goal includes the continued development of adaptive sensor technologies that can perform the ES mission as the use of increasingly more complex communication systems continues to evolve.

Major Technical Challenges

The increasing use of common carrier commercial communications networks by potential adversaries presents the major technical challenge. This infers the need for advanced front end receiver architectures and signal processing techniques capable of providing ES mission functions against increasingly complex signal modulation methods and structures coupled to higher data rates and user protection schemes.

c. RF-Directed Energy Weapons

Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) include laser, high power radio frequency (HPRF), and particle beam technologies. HPRF technology is frequently called high power microwave (HPM) or RF-Directed Energy.

Electronic equipment can be defeated or impaired by irradiation from Directed Energy (DE) sources. Degradation can range from: (1) temporary "upsets" in electronics subsystems, (2) permanent circuit deterioration, or (3) permanent destruction due to burnout or electrical overload. As modern systems and their components become ever more reliant on sophisticated electronics, they also become more vulnerable to DE radiation. The Army’s DE program priority is to assess potential vulnerability of U.S. systems to unintentional irradiation "fratricide" by our DE capable systems as well as intentional irradiation by enemy DE systems. DE hardening technology is being developed to mitigate both of these threats. In addition, the Army S&T program provides sources and components to (1) support the susceptibility assessment program, (2) support possible future applications, and (3) avoid technological surprise from an adversary’s breakthrough.

Goals and Time Frames

Near-term goals for RF-DE weapons are (1) the demonstration of the interference modulation HPM source concept for use in susceptibility testing and in field tests, and (2) RF-DE weapons hardening for MMIC circuits used in Army systems. A mid-term goal is the development of High-Gain, broadband antennas. Long-term goals include development of silicon carbide hardening devices and use of chaos theory research results to achieve greater control of RF-DE weapon sources.

Major Technical Challenges

High power RF generators need to be smaller, lighter, and more fuel efficient. Projected targets require intensive susceptibility studies to determine the best attack methods. These technical challenges will be overcome by concentrating technology development efforts on improving modulators, RF sources, and antennas. Improvements to reduce size, weight, and power requirements must also be accomplished by enhancements to radiate beam control.

d. Lasers

Compact, high efficiency lasers are critical for electro-optical countermeasures (EOCM), infrared countermeasures (IRCM), and directed energy (DEW) applications. The maturation of diode pumped lasers, nonlinear frequency conversion techniques, and advanced laser design has made feasible the incorporation of these devices into tactical vehicles and aircraft for self-protection and missile defense. The challenge is to demonstrate the required power levels in a compact package for Army applications and to scale the power to higher levels for future needs.

Goals and Time Frames

One FY96 goal was to demonstrate compact mid-infrared lasers to meet an Army ATD requirement. This was accomplished under a DARPA/Tri-Service program that increased power by an order of magnitude. Optically and electronically pumped solid-state lasers that will transition to EMD by FY00 should have significantly lower cost, size, and power consumption. These lasers are being developed under a management agreement between DARPA and the Services. An Active Tracker System was developed under another DARPA program for IRCM/EOCM applications to provide precision pointing and atmospheric compensation. This technology was demonstrated in FY96. The DARPA/Army 10 Joule/100 Hz diode pumped laser (DAPKL) was demonstrated in the lab in FY95 and is scheduled to be packaged for delivery in FY97.

Major Technical Challenges

The major challenge to scaling the mid-infrared lasers is the development of an OPO (Optical Parametric Oscillator) which can handle the higher average powers without damage. Other issues are the packaging of lasers for use on aircraft and the cost reduction of laser diode arrays. A longer term challenge will be the scaling of compact solid-state lasers to higher powers for standoff directed energy applications.

Specific challenges include:

Increasing power/weight by threefold for sensor countermeasure systems.
Scaling the power output of solid-state lasers by 10X to 20X in a compact package.
Developing direct diode laser sources with wavelengths from blue/UV to mid infrared.
Reducing the cost of laser diode arrays to less than $1/peak watt.

4. Roadmap of Technology Objectives

The roadmap of technology objectives for Electronic Warfare/Directed Energy Weapons is shown in Table IV-K-1, below.

Table IV-K-1. Technical Objectives for Electronic Warfare/Directed Energy Weapons
А. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) RAVEN JW is all-composites cantilever monoplane conventional configuration with piston engine. The guidance and control systems comprise of ground control station and the board control system (autopilot, GPS-receiver, transmitter for teleinformation, receiver for telecontrol, primary information unit and piloted sensors). Remotely piloting system provides direct remote piloting by an operator and programmed autonomous flight.

Spread /of wings/

4.5 m

Range of operation above

150 km

Length (without of antennas)

4.6 m

Durance of flight

Height (without of antennas)

1.86 m

Speed range


Power supply system

2000 W

Cruising speed

150 km/h

Effective load at distance 150 km

35 kg

Operating heights

200 ÷ 3000 m

Working temperature, С

-400 ÷ +550


With autopilot

Hours of flying between two technical maintenance

250 h

Maximum distance of preprogramming

40 km

В. Airborne Jammer AJ™300X

AJ™300X jammer is a dedicated device for suppression of tactical and airborne radio communication links as well as communication links for aviation command and guidance in 20÷6 000 MHz frequency range. It is used for locking of speech and digital radio communications in the range mentioned above. AJ™300X creates intensive wideband noise jamming of dedicated spectrum which saturates practically the whole frequency range radius. The jamming transmitted suppresses the operation of hostile technical reconnaissance devices located in jammer's area of operation.

Transmitting modules: 38 pcs

Jamming range: 20÷6000 MHz

Power of each sub-band: ≈ 50 W

Mode of jamming: Wideband

Power supply for one transmitting module: ≈ 200 W

Type of jamming: Fast Random Scanning

Control: Remote program control
Electronic Warfare Drone System RAVEN JW comprises of a small, hardly detectable aircraft that can carry means for electronic warfare at a distance of more than 50 km from the place of its launching. In flight above 1000 m it effectively suppresses radio links to a range of 10000m in a wide frequency range 20 ÷ 6000 MHz. When penetrating above the enemy and in the barraging zone it flies in a completely autonomous mode.
high-power microwaves – “…The peculiar thing about space warfare is that many of the innovations that sound the most far-fetched — like illuminating a battlefield at night with light that only one side can see or the deployment of high-power microwave pills — are actually much closer to existence, technologically, than some items that might seem more logically in line for development. Consider the spaceplane. It would be a tremendous tool for the military, since it could get to any point on the globe in a few hours. But building a manned craft that can quickly glide in and out of low orbits has proved incredibly daunting. Earlier this year, the X-33, NASA’s big experiment in flying into space, ended in failure. The image that most people have of “Star Wars”-style combat — manned spaceplanes engaging in dogfights near the moon — is very far off. But the use of space for weaponry directed back at earth or guided from space is pretty much at hand. “I’m particularly excited about high-power microwaves,” Beason tells me. Lacking the thousand-mile reach of lasers, H.P.M.’s, as they are called, can be projected only about a half-mile. But were an unmanned plane guided from space able to transport a high-powered microwave device close to a battlefield, the possibilities could push the Pentagon’s bomb-to-target ratio even closer to perfection. To an invading army of modern soldiers, a massive hit by high-powered microwave could ground their high-tech weapons, leaving them to wage modern warfare with their fists. The time lag between the current R.&D. on microwaves and its application in the battlefield may be a while. Beason himself estimates 15 years, although one use is on the verge of showing up in battlefields soon. On the ground, a microwave weapon could be used to drive back an invading squadron. “It’ll feel like opening the door of an oven,” Beason says. “We’re testing it on humans now.” He pauses and worries that he is bumping up against classified information. “If you want to know more,” he adds, “you’ll have to contact the Human Effectiveness Directorate…” (The next battlefield may be in Outer Space)

domestic intelligence network – “…It just gets scarier. The Black Ops that Mr. Tice was involved in related to electronic intelligence gathering via space systems communications, non-communications signals, electronic warfare, satellite control, telemetry, sensors, and special capability systems.For greater insight as to the impact of these programs readers should review decades old FOIA authenticated programs such as MKULTRA, BLUEBIRD, COINTELPRO and ARTICHOKE. Radar based Telemetry involves the ability to see through walls without thermal imaging. Electronic Warfare is even scarier if we take a look at the science. NSA Signals Intelligence Use of EMF Brain Stimulation. NSA Signals Intelligence uses EMF Brain Stimulation for Remote Neural Monitoring (RNM) and Electronic Brain Link (EBL). EMF Brain Stimulation has been in development since the MKUltra program of the early 1950’s, which included neurological research into “radiation” (non-ionizing EMF) and bioelectric research and development. The resulting secret technology is categorized at the National Security Archives as “Radiation Intelligence,” defined as “information from unintentionally emanated electromagnetic waves in the environment, not including radioactivity or nuclear detonation.” Signals Intelligence implemented and kept this technology secret in the same manner as other electronic warfare programs of the U.S. government. The NSA monitors available information about this technology and withholds scientific research from the public. There are also international intelligence agency agreements to keep this technology secret. The NSA has proprietary electronic equipment that analyzes electrical activity in humans from a distance. NSA computer-generated brain mapping can continuously monitor all the electrical activity in the brain continuously. The NSA records and decodes individual brain maps (of hundreds of thousands of persons) for national security purposes. EMF Brain Stimulation is also secretly used by the military for Brain-to-computer link (In military fighter aircraft, for example). For electronic surveillance purposes electrical activity in the speech center of the brain can be translated into the subject’s verbal thoughts. RNM can send encoded signals to the brain’s auditory cortex thus allowing audio communication direct to the brain (bypassing the ears). NSA operatives can use this to covertly debilitate subjects by simulating auditory hallucinations characteristic of paranoid schizophrenia. Without any contact with the subject, Remote Neural Monitoring can map out electrical activity from the visual cortex of a subject’s brain and show images from the subject’s brain on a video monitor. NSA operatives see what the surveillance subject’s eyes are seeing. Visual memory can also be seen. RNM can send images direct to the visual cortex. bypassing the eyes and optic nerves. NSA operatives can use this to surreptitiously put images in a surveillance subject’s brain while they are in R.E.M. sleep for brain-programming purposes. Individual citizens occasionally targeted for surveillance by independently operating NSA personnel NSA personnel can control the lives of hundreds of thousands of individuals in the U.S. by using the NSA’s domestic intelligence network and cover businesses. The operations independently run by them can sometimes go beyond the bounds of law. Long-term control and sabotage of tens of thousands of unwitting citizens by NSA operatives is likely to happen. NSA Domint has the ability to covertly assassinate U.S. citizens or run covert psychological control operations to cause subjects to be diagnosed with ill mental health. National Security Agency Signals Intelligence Electronic Brain Link Technology NSA SigInt can remotely detect, identify and monitor a person’s bioelectric fields…” (Is the NSA Conducting Electronic Warfare On Americans?)

Space warfare is combat that takes place in outer space, i.e. outside the atmosphere. Space warfare therefore includes ground-to-space warfare, such as attacking satellites from the Earth, as well as space-to-space warfare, such as satellites attacking satellites. It does not include the use of satellites for espionage, surveillance, or military communications, however useful those activities might be. It does not technically include space-to-ground warfare, where orbital objects attack ground, sea or air targets directly, but the public and media frequently use the term to include any conflict which includes space as a theater of operations, regardless of the intended target. For example, a rapid delivery system in which troops are deployed from orbit might be described as “space warfare,” even though the military uses the term as described above. A film was produced by the U.S. Military in the early 1960s called Space and National Security which depicted space warfare. From 1985 to 2002 there was a United States Space Command, which in 2002 merged with the United States Strategic Command. There is a Russian Space Force, which was established on August 10, 1992, and which became an independent section of the Russian military on June 1, 2001. Only a few incidents of space warfare have occurred in world history, and all were training missions, as opposed to actions against real opposing forces. In the mid-1980s a USAF pilot in an F-15 successfully shot down the P78-1, a communications satellite in a 345 mile (555 km) orbit. In 2007 the People’s Republic of China used a missile system to destroy one of its obsolete satellites (see 2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test), and in 2008 the United States similarly destroyed its malfunctioning satellite USA 193. To date, there have been no human casualties resulting from conflict in space, nor has any ground target been successfully neutralized from orbit. International treaties governing space limit or regulate conflicts in space and limit the installation of weapon systems, especially nuclear weapons…Directed-Energy Weapons – A USAF Boeing YAL-1 airborne laser.Weapon systems that fall under this category include lasers, linear particle accelerators or particle-beam based weaponry, microwaves and plasma-based weaponry. Particle beams involve the acceleration of charged or neutral particles in a stream towards a target at extremely high velocities, the impact of which creates a reaction causing immense damage. Most of these weapons are theoretical or impractical to implement currently, aside from lasers which are starting to be used in terrestrial warfare. That said, directed-energy weapons are more practical and more effective in a vacuum (i.e. space) than in the Earth’s atmosphere, as in the atmosphere the particles of air interfere with and disperse the directed energy. Obviously, that problem would not occur in space.
BAE Systems is the world leader in electronic warfare, maximizing mission effectiveness and warfighter survivability for all three electronic warfare missions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic support.

Built on a foundation of more than 60 years of experience, BAE Systems has emerged as the world leader in electronic warfare, flying systems on more than 80 platforms. Unsurpassed in the field across the electromagnetic spectrum, our state-of-the-art technology maximizes mission survivability for the warfighter, providing end-to-end capabilities to counter current and emerging threats.

The success of today was shaped by the development of radar defense and surveillance technology, during the 1950s, that is still the basis for modern systems. The development of this early system helped drive the creation of a state-of-the-art countermeasure system which was aboard all U.S. carrier-based aircraft during the Vietnam War.

Over the course of the next 20 years, industry-leading countermeasure technology was developed to create an integrated electronic warfare suite and stealthy antenna system for the F-22.

BAE Systems’ excellence continues apace. We are creating the electronic warfare suite for the F-35 Lightning II. Additionally, our development and delivery of the Digital Electronic Warfare System (DEWS) has given the F-15 extended purpose worldwide, enhancing the aircraft’s survivability and mission capability for future use.

Building on our rich heritage, BAE Systems remains committed to developing technology to counter emerging threats to the warfighter. Much of that development begins in the Dr. John R. Kreick Infrared Jam and Simulation Lab, where our engineers work closely with missiles and infrared-guided air systems to develop countermeasure techniques. With 46 years of missile testing experience, this lab helps us determine how specific missiles operate and how to improve jamming technology. Utilizing six jamming simulators, we evaluate more than 48,000 missile shots from over 30 different missile types per day.

Innovating to meet the future needs of the warfighter, BAE Systems has produced more than 10,000 tactical electronic warfare systems. Built on a foundation of revolutionary technology, BAE Systems is committed to excellence, as we continue to expand our technological offerings to help maximize mission effectiveness and warfighter survivability in electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support missions now and into the future.
Electronic protection Electronic support

Multispectral, RF/IR countermeasures

Off-board and on-board systems

Rapid detection, identification, and tracking

Direction finding and geolocation

Passive targeting support

Missile warning
Electronic attack Mission support

Electronic attack of military and commercial communications, navigation, and radar systems

Threat analysis and response

Multispectral, RF/threat management systems

Off-board and on-board self-protection systems

Operational analysis

Mission planning tools and data file generators

Mission and battle management

Avionics test systems and maintenance aids

View our Electronic Warfare Infographic






EC-130H Compass Call









Other classified platforms
Key Products

AN/ALR-94 F-22 Multi-band Defensive ECM System
AN/ALQ-239 Digital Electronic Warfare System (DEWS)
AN/ASQ-239 F-35 EW/CM System
AN/APR-50 B-2 Defensive Management System

Electronic Warfare Products

AN/ALE-55 Fiber-Optic Towed Decoy
AN/ALR-56C Radar Warning Receiver
AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receiver
Stores System Tester (SST)
AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS)
AN/ALE-47 Chaff/Flare Dispensing system
AN/ALE-52V Countermeasures
AN/ALE-58 BOL Countermeasures
AN/ALM-288 (ALE-47 Tester)
AN/ALQ-221 Integrated EW
AN/ALQ-144 Infrared (IR) Countermeasures Set
AN/ALQ-157 Infrared Countermeasure
AN/ALQ-161 Band 8
AN/ALQ-212 Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM)
AN/ALR-2001 ESM System
AN/USM-464 (A)
JETEYE™ Commercial Airliner Infrared Missile Protection!%40%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Du6cquc2oz_1%26_afrLoop%3D544225923543000%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Du6cquc2oz_113

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